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The UK government’s attempt to ‘prevent’ terrorism and extremism in the university 
sector is rightly seen as an intolerant threat to academic freedom. However, this 
development has not come from a ‘right wing’ authoritarian impulse, but rather, 
replicates many of the discussions already taking place in universities about the need 
to protect ‘vulnerable’ students from offensive and dangerous ideas. Historically, the 
threat to academic freedom came from outside the university, from pressures exerted 
from governments, from religious institutions who oversaw a particular institution or 
from the demands of business. Alternatively it was been seen as something that is a 
particular problem in non-Western countries that do not have democracy. While some 
of these problems and pressures remain, there is a more dangerous threat to academic 
freedom that comes from within universities, a triumvirate of a relativistic academic 
culture, a new body of identity based student activists and a therapeutically oriented 
university management, all three of which have helped to construct universities as 
safe spaces for the newly conceptualised ‘vulnerable student’. With reference to the 
idea of vulnerability, this paper attempts to chart and explain these modern 
developments. 
 




The lay public is under no compulsion to accept or to act upon the opinions of the 
scientific experts whom, through the universities, it employs. But it is highly needful, 
in the interest of society at large, that what purport to be the conclusions of men 
trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the conclusions of 
such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public, or of the individuals who 
endow or manage universities To the degree that professional scholars, in the 
formation and promulgation of their opinions, are, or by the character of their tenure 
appear to be, subject to any motive other than their own scientific conscience and a 
desire for the respect of their fellow experts, to that degree the university teaching 
profession is corrupted; its proper influence upon public opinion is diminished and 
vitiated; and society at large fails to get from its scholars, in an unadulterated form, 
the peculiar and necessary service which it is the office of the professional scholar to 
furnish (American Association of University Professors, 1915). 
 
The above quote is from the Declaration of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 
written over 100 years ago in 1915 by the American Economics, Politics and Sociological 
Associations. Of particular interest when reading this document is the unadulterated belief in 
the role of the academic to be ‘dedicated to the quest for truth’: Something that was 
understood to depend upon the absolute freedom of academics to pursue their ideas 
dependent upon their own ‘moral conscience’ as academics. 
 
This paper aims to look at the assault on academic freedom. It does so in large part by 
looking at the attack on freedom of speech, especially in the university sector: The argument 
being that academic freedom and freedom of speech are intimately connected. An attack on 
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free speech therefore will necessarily have repercussions for academic freedom and vice 
versa, and there are a growing number of attacks upon free speech today.  
 
Within American universities, in 1915, pressures upon academics to conform to particular 
ideas came from outside of the university, from powerful vested interests or other 
conservative outlooks or interest groups. Today, concerns about economic and political 
pressures remain. However, there has been a more significant attack upon academic freedom 
over the last few decades that has comes from within the university itself (Altbach, 2001). 
This internal undermining of academic freedom and freedom of speech is now accelerating 
with the arguments related to safe spaces, trigger warnings, and the need to protect both staff 
and students from offensive words and behaviour. 
 
The Truth?  
 
Before looking at current developments regarding academic freedom in universities it is 
worth noting that within academia itself there has been a significant ‘radical’ critique of 
freedom of speech generated (in part) by a rejection of the idea of the ‘pursuit of truth’. In 
one respect what we are witnessing in the challenge to academic freedom is the outcome of 
the collapse (or at least the serious decline) of liberalism, Enlightenment ideas and the belief 
in knowledge as a search for truth (Furedi 2007; Eagleton 2014).  
 
Above we see how the various United States academic associations, in a matter of fact 
manner, discussed the essence of academic life being the pursuit of truth. It is difficult to find 
such a statement today within academia that does not come with some revision or amendment 
that runs counter to this sentiment. Indeed the very idea of the pursuit of truth, as Furedi 
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notes, increasingly sounds somehow pompous and other-worldly, we are inclined to celebrate 
‘cultures’ for example, rather than to encourage a sense of being ‘cultured’, the latter being 
tarnished with accusations of power and privilege. Despite the need for ‘standards’ there is a 
defensiveness in the promotion of this (ivory tower) idea that feels conservative and as Furedi 
notes in Where have all the intellectuals gone, ideas first promoted by individuals like Michel 
Foucault, that there are ‘no truly universal truths’ have become increasingly influential in 
academic circles (Furedi, 2004, pp. 4).  
 
It is in part the diminishing belief in ideas themselves, perhaps especially in terms of how 
they relate to progress and the transformation of society that has undermined John Stuart 
Mills’ arguments about liberty (Jacoby, 1999). For Mill, the importance of tolerance and 
liberty were in part, and arguably in large part, related to a belief in ‘man as a progressive 
being’ (Harcourt, 1999, pp. 187). His faith in rationality led to a robust defence of freedom 
and the free exchange of ideas – the more freedom the individual had the more society could 
find the truth and to progress. For Mill, writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the 
most dynamic country in the world, this coupling of individual freedom and social progress 
made sense. However, as social problems developed in capitalist society through the 
twentieth century, and indeed as alternatives to capitalism appeared to wane and to 
themselves appear to be oppressive, this faith in progress and humanity declined, and as with 
Foucault or Herbert Marcuse, not only were certain ‘truths’ seen as problematic, but so too 
was the very idea of Truth (Furedi, 1992, pp. 252-258). 
 
If truth is problematic, indeed if the promotion of the pursuit of truth is seen as elitist and 
oppressive, then the freedom necessary to pursue truth is also problematic. Jason Walsh has 
observed in his study of the ‘expanding empire of harm’, that critical social thinkers like 
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Herbert Marcuse as far back as 1965 were beginning to question the value of classical notions 
of progress, tolerance and freedom, including freedom of speech – the twin to academic 
freedom. For Marcuse, for example, progress was understood as profoundly negative, as 
‘bound up with intensified unfreedom…. the domination of man by man’. To press home the 
point Marcuse argues that, ‘Concentration camps, mass exterminations, world wars, and atom 
bombs are no ‘relapse into barbarism’, but the unrepressed implementation of the 
achievements of modern science, technology, and domination’ (Marcuse, 1972, pp. 23). 
Earlier, in his ‘Repressive Tolerance’ written in 1965, he discusses tolerance as a bourgeois 
oppressive concept, a mere ideology that favours and fortified the status quo of inequality and 
discrimination (Walsh, 2015).  
 
Mill was famed for arguing the case for the one man having the right to speak even though 
his opinion was in opposition to the whole of humanity. But as faith in positive outcomes 
resulting from a clash of ideas declined, the argument grew that we should supress, rather 
than tolerate, reactionary ideas. As Coleman notes, for example, following the Second World 
War it was the Soviet Union under Stalin where we find these repressive ideas in a state form, 
indeed it was here that the idea of limiting hate speech emerged – something Western nations 
opposed as illiberal and authoritarian (Coleman, 2012). However, in the 1970s this defence of 
speech began to change and perhaps most importantly began to change for radical individuals 
and groups so that by the 1980s the idea of ‘hate crimes’ developed and over the next two 
decades words came to be seen as causing ‘trauma’, particularly for ‘vulnerable groups’ 
(Waiton, 2019).  
 
Amy Adler describes the ‘radical’ challenges to the idea of freedom and tolerance that 
developed within two left-inspired schools of thought, schools of thought that sought to 
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regulate speech. She observed, ‘The feminist anti-pornography movement, led by Catharine 
MacKinnon, and the anti-"hate speech" school, led by a group of legal scholars… wish[ed] to 
prohibit speech that harms historically victimised classes of society’ (To get a sense of 
MacKinnon’s influence, she was made the first Special Gender Adviser to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court in 2008). These developments, Adler notes was, ‘nothing 
less than a war on traditional First Amendment jurisprudence’ (Adler, 1996, pp. 1500). One 
of the dangers in the approach of these ‘schools’, Adler believed, was that in their attempt to 
protect vulnerable groups from offensive images and words, language took on a life of its 
own and the intension behind the use of words vanished. Ultimately this resulted in not just 
racists but also anti-racists and equality campaigners being targeted for their own use of 
certain words because, ‘Intension and effect are ultimately disjointed’ (Adler, 1996, pp. 
1572).  
 
A key reason for this censorious development within the left, Adler usefully notes, was that 
‘activist speech’ was no longer seen as ‘an agent of social change’ (Adler, 1996, pp. 1567). If 
the First Amendment existed alongside slavery, the argument went, then why should we have 
faith in freedom of speech as a vehicle for liberation?  
 
For critics of these developments, like Walsh and Adler, it was not new ideas themselves or a 
more nuanced understanding about how the world worked that undermined the idea of 
tolerance and freedom of speech. Rather, in this radical guise, it was, what Russell Jacoby 
calls the ‘end of utopia’ or the loss of belief in the possibility of radical social change and of 
human progress that led academics and activists to turn their backs on what was now seen as 
a futile or fictional search for ‘truth’. More than this, Jacoby argues, with the decline of the 
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‘old’ enlightened left, liberalism lost its backbone and the ideals of liberty and freedom began 
to wither (Jacoby, 1999).    
 
In the UK, one of the outcomes of the decline of the labour movement and the diminished 
sense of political possibilities, by some of those on the left, was that sections of society who 
had previously been understood through the political category of ‘oppression’ increasingly 
became reconceptualised through a more therapeutic prism and were relabelled as ‘vulnerable 
groups’ (Waiton, 2019). As this projection of ‘vulnerability’ became normalised, new laws 
increasingly developed in Britain to protect people from offensive behaviour and words 
(Waiton, 2019). Over the next two decades the category of vulnerability, Furedi (2004) 
argues, both remained associated with these ‘vulnerable groups’, but in culture and law 
became a more universalising characteristic that helped to repose the understanding of harm. 
Through the prism of vulnerability the meaning of harm expanded, a key dimension of this 
being a profound elevation of the sense of emotional vulnerability often associated with the 
idea of being offended. Within this framework language has been further problemtised and 
increasingly understand as a form of abuse and violence. 
 
On both sides of the Atlantic, as we moved into the new millennium, the philosopher Joel 
Feinberg noted, we had moved from Mill’s harm principle to the offence principle (Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2017). The consequence of this move for academic freedom 
and freedom of speech are significant, perhaps less in the overt punishment of those 
committing offence, although this is a reality, than in the cultural climate and acceptance of 






Before we look at what Ben Garrison has called the rise of the ‘crybullies’ in universities, it is 
worth unpicking the UK government’s anti-terrorism Prevent strategy, or duty, and to look at 
the question and meaning of tolerance to illustrate the extent to which modern day ‘Western 
values’ are in many respects a threat to the very idea of liberty they, in theory, uphold 
(Garrison, 2015).  
 
The government’s Prevent strategy is of significance because it is an example of an overt use 
of state power over universities and as such it has been widely condemned, so widely in fact 
that it would be hard to find a university Principal or indeed many university lecturers across 
the whole of the UK who enthusiastically support this initiative. The lecturer’s union, the 
UCU, for example, condemns Prevent as a threat to academic freedom, to legitimate campus 
activism, for its potential racism and for encouraging lecturers to become spies (UCU, 2015). 
And yet when we examine the wording and the framework of understanding in Prevent we 
find many of the wider concerns about ‘vulnerable students’ that are more readily endorsed 
by academics and academic institutions, are central to this government anti-terror initiative. 
On consideration it appears that the seemingly authoritarian British state and their more 
liberal and radical university critics have more in common than they might imagine. The 
opposition to Prevent is interesting because it reflects a flawed sense that the threat to 
academic freedom comes from a right wing authoritarian state imposing its will on the 
institution when the reality is both that this state is largely a fiction and that the threat to 
academic freedom comes more from within the academy itself and often from the more 
seemingly liberal concerns about protecting the vulnerable. As Williams notes, ‘A focus on 
the requirements of the Prevent Duty ignores the less obvious but therefore more insidious 
restrictions on academic freedom that emerges from within universities from students, 
9 
 
institutional expectations and a desire not to cause offence’. (Hudson and Williams, 2016, pp. 
xv). 
 
The duty to ‘Prevent’ extremism in universities is developed in Section 26 of the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The guidance to this act has now been passed onto 
universities who in their turn are attempting to enforce this legislation that makes it a legal 
requirement for universities to prevent extremism within their institutions, by, in part, 
monitoring the reading material of their students or limiting certain outside speakers, a move 
condemned by Williams who notes that this ‘risks turning universities into agents, rather than 
critics, of the state’ (Hudson and Williams, 2016, pp. xv).  
 
This Prevent strategy was first published by the government in 2011 ‘as part of their overall 
counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST’, with the stated aim being to ‘reduce the threat to the 
UK from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (UCU, 
2015). In this act we find a specific duty on behalf of the authorities, including colleges and 
universities, to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism’ (my italics). Here ‘extremism’ is defined as, ‘Vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (UCU, 2015: 2). 
 
The attempt to force universities to overtly monitor their students and limit and regulate the 
ideas they can engage with sits uncomfortably with the idea of ‘individual liberty’ promoted 
by the government as a British value. Academic freedom, in the sense promoted by the 
American Association of University Professors, means that there should be no limits upon the 
ideas, issues or reading material available within a university or no limits that lecturers 
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themselves do not frame. The Prevent strategy is a clear negation of this approach to 
academic life and has rightly been condemned by the UCU and others.  
 
This contradiction, of the British government promoting ‘liberty’ on the one hand while 
undermining it on the other, appears to be an ongoing problem for Western government’s 
when dealing with modern day terrorism. Democratic governments  denounce terrorists and 
denounce them for undermining ‘our way of life’ – including our liberty and freedom - while 
at the same time creating new laws and initiatives to clamp down on various freedoms and 
develop oppressive forms of policing. In France, for example, the comic Dieudonne M'bala 
M'bala was arrested after the Charlie Hebdo murders for writing ‘I feel like Charlie 
Coulibaly’. Others were arrested for speech crimes leading to the French League of Human 
Rights denounced the state action for imprisoning ‘drunks and fools’ (BBC, 2015). In the UK 
in 2019 the police used the Terrorism Act 2000 in a failed attempt to demand that journalists 
hand over notes from their interviews with terrorist Shamima Begum, the notorious ‘jihadi 
bride’. Despite this case failing, free speech advocate Mick Hume noted that this was helping 
to create an authoritarian climate within which journalists feel the state ‘looking over their 
shoulders’ when dealing with terrorist reporting (Hume, 2019). 
 
The Prevent strategy is one of a number of terror related laws that limit freedoms. More 
generally the attack on freedom of speech has also come with laws, initiatives and campaigns 
to deal with ‘offensiveness’ and ‘hate’. (Waiton, 2012; Rooney, 2018). What is particularly 
interesting from our perspective when looking at the Prevent strategy and its explanation of 
British values is the seemingly interconnected ideas of ‘individual liberty’ with the idea of 
‘mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’. At one level, this statement 
could be seen as unproblematic – being tolerant of religious differences and beliefs has been 
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a central plank of liberalism since Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration, written in 1689, 
and more particularly since J.S. Mills On Liberty. However, tolerating something and 
respecting something is very different, indeed, the conflation of the two terms reflects an 
underlying contradiction in the modern idea of tolerance  Furedi (2011) has observed, what 
we in the West mean by tolerance has changed and in many respects modern day ‘tolerance’ 
means the opposite to what it previously meant. To be tolerant in the past meant accepting the 
right of people to hold and express different views without interference from the state - it was 
the basis of the argument for free speech and ultimately for the promotion of academic 
freedom. Today, this meaning has changed fundamentally and now, being a tolerant person, 
means being someone who is not offensive to others, someone who ‘respects difference’. It is 
in fact the new basis for limiting freedom of speech.  
 
Today the apparent British value of being tolerant is in fact a direct challenge to the idea of 
individual liberty because being a tolerant person or institution increasingly means regulating 
and restricting people who are deemed to be intolerant. In a university context it means 
managing and policing words and ideas that are seen as offensive and therefore harmful: 




In looking at the changing meaning of tolerance it is worth starting with the classic work on 
liberty written by John Stuart Mill’s in 1859. In Mill’s work, to tolerate something, one first 
had to judge it, disagree with it but also accept that it should not be controlled by the 
authorities simply because one thought it was wrong or repugnant: You do not have to 
tolerate ideas that you agree with, you tolerate wrong ideas and behaviour, but also challenge 
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what you see as reactionary viewpoints and behaviour. For Mill, the principle was clear – as 
long as no physical or economic harm was done to an individual, ideas and behaviour should 
be tolerated – even, and indeed especially, ideas that you found abhorrent or upsetting. 
‘Wrong’ ideas or behaviour were useful for Mill because they continually encouraged society 
to challenge them, thus strengthening the understanding of ideas across the populace. This 
was important not only for the free development of ideas and beliefs but also, and equally, for 
the development of individual moral autonomy. He who lets the world choose his plan of life 
for him, Mill argued, has no need of any other ability than that of imitation: But this is not the 
action of a ‘man’; it is merely the action of an ape. Part of the belief in the importance of 
personal moral development came from an idea that it was wrong to force beliefs onto 
people. The goal was to encourage a vibrant culture made up of autonomous individuals who 
were free to think and act and also to challenge one another’s behaviour. For the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant, respect was given to people and their freedoms as part of a 
belief that this would help encourage the development of reason and conduct which 
genuinely belonged to each individual. Everyone was to become judgemental, to make their 
own judgements and decisions, and to take responsibility for their own actions (Mill, 2011). 
  
Incorrect or wrong choices were not centrally important for Mill. More crucial was what 
manner of men and women it was that were acting in the first place; what type of individual 
was making the choice. In a sense, as Furedi (2011) notes in On Tolerance, Mill wanted 
everybody to be a heretic – to be a free choosing person – rather than a sheep that simply 
repeats the latest correct and inoffensive mantra. Tolerance was difficult. Accepting rather 
than punishing those whose views and behaviour you hated required strength and maturity, 
and most of all a belief in the importance of freedom. As George Orwell noted, if democracy 
means anything it is the right to tell people what they do not want to hear (Orwell, 2000). We 
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retain our dignity, Furedi argues, only by insisting that no official can withhold an opinion 
from us. Likewise, we only become robust human beings by being faced with conflict, by 
encountering difficult and even offensive ideas and forms of behaviour. Words may well 
hurt, but dealing with them can develop individual character, a more vibrant public life and a 
more articulate society.  
 
Today, in comparison, Furedi argues, the meaning of tolerance has been transformed. This 
has developed over many decades across the Western world, he notes, with little discussion 
or clarification about what this thing tolerance now actually means (Furedi, 2011, pp. 1-25). 
Tolerance now means the opposite of what it used to. It is not about judging, but about being 
non-judgemental, not about speaking your mind but about limiting hurtful speech and 
behaviour, not about limiting state power so allowing free expression but about increasing 
state power to protect people who are seen as fragile and vulnerable. It has become a personal 
characteristic; a badge of decency – ‘I’m a tolerant person’ - disconnected from the idea of 
freedom or even thought. It has also become about ‘respecting difference’: not respecting 
individual freedoms as such, but ‘respecting’ statically-defined groups and identities. It has 
also become a form of politeness based on an understanding that these, officially defined, 
groups and identities are easily bruised by things we say, beliefs we have and types of 
behaviour we exhibit. Consequently, having offensive ideas or behaving in an offensive way 
is understood to cause alarm or distress and needs to be regulated or made illegal. Rather than 
tolerance being about individual freedom and the autonomy of individuals being respected, it 
has become about respecting groups and group identities and protecting them from harm – 





Until relatively recently ‘tolerance’ was the basis upon which free speech was built, today, 
through this transformation of its meaning it is the basis upon which new laws are developed 
that undermine freedom of speech. 
 
The infantilisation of university life 
 
Discussing the Prevent strategy, Bill Durodie (2016) argues that an essential part of this act is 
the attempt to protect students from certain ‘extreme’ ideas at university. Students are 
represented in an infantile way, he argues, but he notes, this is not something new to 
universities that have in fact been treating, what are adults, like children for some time. We 
already, he argues, treat students as fragile or vulnerable individuals who need to be 
protected, and as such the British government are simply reflecting this diminished view of 
students within this strategy. Concerns have been raised about the growing therapeutic nature 
of university life. Furedi for example, has carried out work looking at the infantilisation of 
students, noting the growing trend for parents to accompany students to university open days 
or for parents to act on their grown up children’s behalf when dealing with academic 
disputes. The more infantile adult, he argues, has been encouraged by the psychologisation of 
existential problems, with increasing numbers of children in schools being socialised to 
understand difficulties in mental health terms and to foster a sense of dependency upon 
experts and to embody a more fragile sense of self. One outcome he believes is that when 
these young people face difficult issues or ideas at university they are more inclined to ‘state 
that ‘I am offended’ instead of ‘I disagree’’ (Furedi, 2017, pp. 6-15). 
 
Durodie points out that the key idea behind the Prevent strategy is summed up in the sentence 
referring to the need to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (my italics). This 
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idea that students are somehow ‘drawn into terrorism’, Durodie argues, is a particularly 
passive and infantile view of university students, who are in this instance, not represented as 
moral agents who are making conscious choices, but as fragile individuals who are coaxed 
into doing things against their (limited) will. In the ‘Revised Prevent duty guidance: for 
England and Wales’, the term ‘vulnerable’ is used 17 times, with talk of, ‘the public should 
understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into 
terrorism as a consequence of it’, and the need to ‘recognise vulnerability to being drawn into 
terrorism’. Like young children who are groomed by paedophiles, here we find terrorist are 
no longer free individuals who make immoral choices but diminished, vulnerable subjects 
who need ‘support’ to prevent them being ‘radicalised’ (Home Office 2019). (On this basis I 
could reinterpret my university experience as being vulnerable to radical left wing ideas). 
 
The interesting thing about the Prevent strategy is that despite the huge amount of criticism it 
has faced from academics, hardly anyone appears to have noticed or found a problem with 
this representation of grown adults as ‘vulnerable’. This is because the idea that students are 
vulnerable and need to be protected has been institutionalised within universities themselves, 
accepted and promoted by many academics and celebrated by student activists in their 
promotion of universities as ‘safe spaces’, witnessed in the growing concern about ‘micro-
aggression’, and seen with the growth of ‘Trigger Warning’. These new developments that 
are growing in the United States of America and the UK are becoming increasingly 
influential and are a new threat to both free speech and academic freedom.  
 




Trigger warnings are advisory labels that classify books, journal articles, films or other 
material to be used by a student that may ‘traumatise’ them in some way. The warnings are 
used to protect students from issues or words related to ‘racism, classicism, sexism, 
heterosexism, cissexism, ableism and other privilege and oppression’ (Hume, 2015, pp. 130). 
Searching the Guardian newspaper, it is noticeable that there were no articles about trigger 
warnings until 2014. This first article raised concerns about trigger warnings in the US that 
forced labels onto books, including The Great Gatsby. The warning read, ‘Warning: suicide, 
domestic abuse and graphic violence’ (Guardian, 2014). Interestingly, this development of 
trigger warnings appears to have been pushed less by university management in the UK than 
by academics who have taken it upon themselves (often with the support of student 
organisations) to protect their students from certain material. It is also strongly endorsed by 
student union association who argue that these warnings encourage debate because they 
prevent students from being traumatised and so enable them to take part in that debate 
(Oxford SU). Increasingly, however, university management, as part of their wider 
therapeutic approach to students, are beginning to react to concerns about the content of 
lectures and encourage the use of trigger warnings. 
 
University College, London, for example, has told students studying the archaeology of 
modern conflict course that they can leave class if they find discussions ‘disturbing’ or 
‘traumatising’. In 2019, in the UK, the head of English at the University of York apologised 
to ‘students who were offended when they came across the word ‘negro’ in lecturers about 
the work of the African-American sociologist W.E.B. Dubois’ (AFAF, 2020). The lecturer 
has now incorporated trigger warnings for his lecturers. Furedi, in response, argued that, ‘The 
obsession with the policing of language has become a caricature of itself. The word negro, 
which was used by pan-Africanists to refer to themselves, is now rebranded as a source of 
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distress by students who do not have a clue about what racism means’ (AFAF, 2020). With 
the Dubois case we find rather than a discussion and clarification about how to understand 
the term negro in its historical context, the ignorance of the students is endorsed based on 
their emotional reaction and belief that words they find offensive should not be used.  
 
Part of the role of trigger warnings is to allow certain students to avoid reading or viewing 
certain materials that they believe will be emotionally upsetting for them. This has led to 
concerns being raised about this narrow classification of complex material and the potential 
for limiting knowledge and education at universities. A Harvard Law professor has written 
about her concerns that students are being advised not to attend law classes on sexual 
violence in case it makes them feel uncomfortable (New Yorker, 2015). It is difficult to get a 
sense of the extent to which trigger warnings are used in the UK, partly because they are 
often developed informally. However, one examination of Glasgow University, using a 
Freedom of Information Request, found trigger warnings on the modern language course 
relating to fairy tales by the Brothers Grimm, there were trigger warnings on the classics 
course, where frequent ‘flags’ were issued to alert students to content that is different to their 
own culture, the theology course had trigger warnings regarding torture and violence, and 
other warnings were found on the universities history course and veterinary course – the 
veterinary trigger warning was introduced after a complaint of sexism by a student regarding 
a ‘jokey’ PowerPoint slide about animals (Grant, 2019). 
 
Despite trigger warnings rarely being a proscribed university policy there is concern that they 
act as a form of pressure on lecturers to turn their lecturers into safe, or safer, spaces and to 
avoid controversial ideas and issues. This is likely to be enhanced by the elevated 
understanding of ‘trauma’ associated with the idea of trigger warnings. Ecclestone believes 
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that, ‘This creates....a growing tendency towards small, almost unconscious, incidents of self-
censorship and self-editing and a growing sense of hesitancy in how we teach’ (Ecclestone, 
2016, 173).  
 
In the UK, there is a growing trend for management of universities to increasingly relate to 
students, to student associations and what they call the ‘student experience’, to ensure that 
student needs are being met. There is also a wider cultural pressure and indeed legal pressure 
regarding diversity and the legal need to promote diversity.  The Equalities Act 2010, for 
example, makes it a legal duty for universities to ensure a duty of care regarding 
offensiveness in relation to people with ‘protected characteristics’. Both the cultural and legal 
pressure helps to heighten an awareness of the need to be inoffensive and acts as a form of 
pressure on university management and upon lecturers. As one lecturer noted,  
 
Students are already primed from university marketing and induction material to 
expect their views to hold sway and that the function of all who work at the university 
is to meet their needs. Nowhere are the new recruits inducted into the concept and 
practice of academic freedom. We tell them we will listen to their voice when they 
speak but rarely teach them that they must allow others the same freedom (Hafez, 
2016, pp. 113). 
 
As Hume notes, trigger warnings began as a therapeutic tool to help individuals with PTSD 
avoid viewing certain images or ideas that they may find particularly distressing and yet this 
form of self-censorship related to individuals with an anxiety disorder has been expanded to 
university materials and could have a significant impact on course materials, teaching 
practices and the language used by academics. This is not direct censorship but relates to 
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what Mill saw as a more significant threat to freedom – the cultural climate that suffocates 
experimentation, free thinking and expression. The very idea of a trigger warning risks 
turning an increasing number of issues, ideas and even words into problems that are 
understood in terms of actual harm done to student wellbeing. One concern, raised by Greg 
Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt is that this approach to students can encourage rather than 
resolve psychological difficulties some students have. As Jarvie notes with reference to their 
work, ‘In The Atlantic, Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt have suggested that a campus that 
coddles students and encourages them to police each other’s speech could have a detrimental 
impact on students’ mental health, teaching them to ‘think pathologically’’ (Jarvie, 2016, pp. 
195). 
 
The subjective nature of experiencing trauma also means that an increasing array of issues 
and ideas are likely to become ‘triggers’, potentially encouraging a form of defensive 
teaching where playing it safe, self-censoring and treating ideas as a potential form of harm 




Another development in US universities and one that is being adopted already in the UK is 
the idea of microaggression. Promoted as a form of hyper-awareness to the need to regulate 
language, microaggression explains the ‘real’ meaning behind everyday comments that are 
made between people. The list of microaggression terms, developed for use in the University 
of California, Los Angeles include comments like, ‘Where are you from’, which implies 
‘You are not a true American’, and, ‘There is only one race, the human race’ which is said to 
be a ‘denial of the significance of a person’s ethnicity’ (UCLA, 2010). Both these terms are 
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said to be a form of racism, regardless of the intention of the person who is speaking and this 
topic is now being discussed in the UK in the framework of ‘everyday racism’.  
 
The potential for the idea of microaggression to determine future academic behaviour can be 
seen in the example of the UCLA professor of education who changed the capitalised, 
‘Indigenous’ to, ‘indigenous’, for grammatical reasons, and faced a protest and sit-in, for 
‘disrespecting the student’s ideological point of view’. Writing about the case, MacDonald 
argues that despite the professor in question being experienced and well respected, and 
despite a key concern being about grammar – the use of a capital ‘I’ – the students were 
appeased by management, thus conferring legitimacy on their claims of racism. The 
professor’s teaching was changed to incorporate other lecturers (MacDonald, 2014).  
 
The fact that an individual in this context can be understood to be disrespectful or even racist, 
regardless of any intention, is particularly problematic for universities. Microaggression is 
understood to often be ‘unwitting’; we do not know we are racist. In many respects the 
decision about a person’s racist behaviour can only be decided by the ‘victim’ and their 
interpretation of what has been said and done. The founder of the term microaggression 
explained that, ‘Nearly all interracial encounters are prone to the manifestation of racial 
microaggression’ (Sue et al., 2007). Taken literally, the potential for interracial discussions to 
take place without microaggression seems unlikely and the potential for challenging 
academics in terms of their use of (unintended racist) language is vast. The student campaign 
around microaggression in Harvard, for example, quickly spread to Oxford University and is 




The concern about microaggression, like trigger warnings, comes less from university 
management than from student activists and ‘radical’ academics. However, some universities, 
like the University of California, have drawn up a list of potential microaggressions. In the 
UK some universities are also beginning to take a more proactive approach to the issue. 
Sheffield University for example recently advertised for posts for 20 paid students to tackle 
micoraggression amongst the student body. The new recruits’ job will be to listen to other 
student conversations and to intervene when they hear ‘subtle but offensive comments’ and to 
encourage ‘healthy conversations’ (Slater, 2020). 
 
Furedi believes that the idea of microaggression is the most significant issue raised in the 
current phase of the culture war in higher education, arguing that, ‘Through offering a wide-
reaching account of prejudice, this concept helps to encourage and validate a disposition to be 
outraged, and fuels a sense of hyper-vigilance towards potential acts as bias’ (Furedi, 2017, 
pp. 107). He hints at a Kafkaesque development where the profoundly subjective nature of 
microaggressions elevates further a cultural anxiety regarding the use of words or even 
letters, potentially leading to a situation where lectures, rather than being free flowing and 
experimental become increasingly scripted, to the letter, to avoid accusations of harm to 
students. After all, ‘Once the doctrine of microaggression is normalised, almost any 
ambiguous gesture or word can become the medium for conveying suspicion and conflict’ 






The idea of a safe space is a place/space where individuals can feel safe – not threatened – by 
certain types of behaviour, ideas and language with which they are uncomfortable – a place 
where you have a sense of ontological security 
 
One of the earlier papers to discuss the ‘educational metaphor’ of the ‘safe space’ was written 
in 1998 and was, noticeably, related to a discussion about school children rather than 
university students (Boostrom, 1998, pp. 397). Interestingly, this paper concluded that this 
well intentioned educational idea, ‘unintentionally undermines critical thinking’ (Boostrom, 
1998, pp. 397). The idea of a safe space within educational institutions has changed over 
time, but with, the emotional wellbeing of the student at its heart, this idea, when developed 
in practice, has the potential to undermine academic freedom and education. Holley and 
Steiner have observed that, in part, the idea of a safe space was developed to encourage risk 
taking and honest expression (Holley and Steiner, 2005, pp. 49). It did not refer to feeling 
‘comfortable’ because for students to grow and learn they must confront issues that make 
them uncomfortable and force them to struggle with who they are and what they believe. 
However, they also note that the idea of a safe space is not about physical safety but about 
protecting a student from psychological and emotional harm (Holley and Steiner, 2005, pp. 
50). Here we find a potential contradiction, particularly when it comes to who is defining 
psychological and emotional harm and what issues, ideas or words can be said to create a 
problem for students: As we have seen with the examples of trigger warnings and 
microaggression, the number of issues, words and ideas that can become problematic is 
expanding considerably. Holley and Steiner recognise this problem when discussing what 
students mean by ‘non-judgemental or non-critical instructions or fellow students’. As they 
argue, ‘Does any critique leave some students feeling threatened and unsafe? Are there many 
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or some students who will not feel safe in any classroom where their ideas or beliefs are 
challenged?’ (Holley and Steiner, 2005, pp. 50). 
 
The UK’s National Union of Students (NUS) has a ‘safe space’ policy that is endorsed by 
many university NUS organisations. These polices relate to harassment and intimidation but 
also argue that student’s should be free from ‘judgement’. Many of the statements relating to 
safe spaces refer to the feelings of the individual student regarding feeling ‘isolated’, feeling 
‘uncomfortable’, not feeling welcome or simply fearing that this may be the case. Relating to 
microaggression, the safe space policies discuss ‘everyday terms’ like ‘gay’ (meaning bad), 
which cannot be allowed because they ‘can also cause offence or reinforce negative 
stereotypes’. At Bristol University the idea of safe spaces has been incorporated into the 
student union code of conduct. Within this code an Anti-discrimination and Harassment 
statement has been produced and representatives are encouraged to read it out ‘at the 
beginning of all large SU activities’. Here the starting point appears to be a presumption of 
student vulnerability and a need to illustrate the protective nature of the student association 
where ‘members are free from fear’ (Bristol SU, 2016). 
 
In the US a race related protest in Missouri took the form of defending a safe space and 
challenging microaggression. Here the administration backed the protestors and the Missouri 
University Police Department put out a call for people to identify anyone who used ‘hurtful 
speech’, something they accepted was not criminal, but could be used as a basis for a 
university disciplinary (Griswold, 2015). Despite what may be legitimate issues being raised 
here, a major concern is that any disagreement with the ‘radical’ protestors is leading to 
claims of microaggression and the term ‘safe space’ is being used aggressively to restrict 
reporting of the issue (Friedersdorf, 2015). In other universities there has also been a move to 
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prevent and even discipline staff who do not prevent ‘cultural appropriation’ by disregarding 
concerns about ‘offensive’ Halloween costumes (Stack, 2015).  Another example of the 
aggressive use of ‘safe spaces’, can we seen on YouTube regarding an Atheist Society 
meeting at Goldsmith University in London that was disrupted by the Islamic Society (a 
disruption supported by the feminist society) due to the belief that the speaker was 
Islamophobic. The speaker Maryam Namazie, a self-proclaimed communist feminist who 
attacks what she sees as right wing Islamic ideas, was confronted by members of the Islamic 
society who used the term ‘safe space’ repeatedly to interrupt her speech (Namazie, 2015).     
 
The idea of safe spaces has grown in universities in both North America and the UK. These 
‘spaces’ are, in many respects, anti-free speech zones or areas where students will not feel 
challenged or offended by views, ideas or words they disagree with or find offensive. When 
adopted as an official university approach, like in Sheffield, or when adopted by student 
associations, these safe spaces become enforced zones of ‘correct’ behaviour for all students 
(and potentially lecturers). When safe spaces incorporate concerns about microaggression the 
potential for the policing of language and behaviour is extensive (Hunt, 2015). At Oxford 
University students have campaigned to have the statue of Cecil Rhodes removed from 
campus because of his colonial past. Beyond politics however the form this protest takes 
relates to the idea of student ‘safety’ and vulnerability, with, for example one campaigner 
arguing that, ‘There’s violence to having to walk past the statue every day’. Here we find not 
only words or ideas but a statue needs to be taken away to protect students from this form of 
‘violence’ (Slater, 2016).   
 
It appears that once the idea of ‘safety’ is adopted in relation to ideas - within the context 
where ‘harm’ relates to emotional sensibilities - the potential for restrictions, censorship and 
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the regulation of free speech and academic freedom is enormous. Concerned with this 
development in the UK the organisation Academics for Academic Freedom (AFAF) was set 
up within the UK. 
 
A safe space is perhaps better thought of as an attitude rather than an actual place, an attitude 
or etiquette that incorporates trigger warnings and microaggression and, as the name 
suggests, elevates the issue of safety, but in particular, does so with reference to ideas and 
words rather than any physical threat. Interestingly, Furedi traces the origins of this idea back 
to Karl Mannheim’s idea of ‘social distancing’ and boundaries set up between groups. One 
aspect of this distancing was its development and persistence in authoritarian civilisations 
seen with the emergence of totalitarian movements in the interwar period (Furedi, 2017, pp. 
72). Fear and the loss of a civil society, and the emergence of ‘safe spaces’ kept people away 
from one another and helped the authoritarians to remain in power. In contrast, democracies 
break down the need and existence of safe spaces – facilitating civil society and a more 
Millsian free flow of ideas and interactions in what could be described as a tolerant space. 
Part of the reason for the emergence of safe spaces Furedi believes, is the elevation of safety 
as a new absolute (Furedi, 1997). In the context of a classroom, Barrett’s research suggests 
that students tend to support the idea of this type of space as one where there identity is 
confirmed and their ideas are appreciated rather than challenged – something Furedi believes 
engages with a more therapeutic sense of both self and of education as a process not of 






In the UK, what are called no platform policies have developed since the 1970s, these are 
policies that prevent certain invited guests from speaking to students due to their beliefs. 
Initially, these policies adopted by student associations, aimed to ban fascist organisations 
like the National Front or the British National Party from speaking. The no platform approach 
has been broadened in recent years to include bans on speakers who are perceived to be racist 
and more recently anyone who is associated with hate crimes or hate speech. Most 
particularly, concerns about transphobia have seen famous feminist academics being 
prevented from speaking. From concerns about extreme political ideas being promoted at 
university the trend has developed to expand the areas of censorship through the language of 
limiting ‘hate’ and more particularly through the concerns about emotional harm generated 
by ‘offensive’ words and images.    
 
In 2015 the online magazine spiked online analysed the restrictions on freedom of speech 
within UK universities by both university management and by student associations. They 
found that when looking at the combined approaches of university management and student 
union policies 80 percent of universities place binding restrictions on freedom of speech: Half 
the universities surveyed across the UK had explicit bans, while many others used what 
spiked argued were ‘more insidious’ restrictions that referred to ‘offensive or insulting 
speech’ (Slater, 2015). Student Associations led the way, with 51 percent having banning 
policies, compared to only 9.5 percent of university institutions having policies of this nature. 
Thirty one percent of university Free Speech policies, aimed at ‘securing free speech within 
the law’, actually place restrictions on ‘offensive’, ‘controversial’ or ‘needlessly provocative’ 
speakers on campus. Also 48 percent of universities are described in the spiked analysis as 




Free speech codes were introduced in the 1986 Education Act. Aimed at ensuring ‘freedom 
of speech within the law’, subsequent laws, codes of practice and over enthusiastic university 
management, have meant these codes have in effect become used to censor rather than free 
debate. The University of Birmingham’s code of practice lists 13 pieces of legislation passed 
since 1986 that may ‘within the law’ impinge upon freedom of speech. These include the 
Terrorism Act (2000), the Criminal Justice Act (2003) and the Equality Act (2010). Bolton 
University lists topics like abortion, immigration or animal experimentation that may, ‘give 
rise to a reasonable apprehension that disruption or disorder may occur’, and should therefore 
not be debated. Joanna Williams argues that, ‘The legislation that has had the biggest impact 
upon free speech on campus is the Equality Act 2010, which offers people legal protection 
‘against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation’’ (my italics). 
Universities like Exeter University talk about the need to limit speech that can be deemed to 
be offensive and go beyond the letter of the law in insisting that, ‘Students, staff, governors, 
the students’ guild and visiting speakers are therefore required to demonstrate sensitivity to 
the diversity of the university community and to show others respect’. As Williams notes, 
freedom of speech is here understood to mean the freedom not to offend, and as author of 
Unlearning Liberty: Campus Censorship and the End of American Debate, Greg Lukianoff 
argues, ‘By following a “sensitivity for everyone” as opposed to a “free speech for everyone” 
model, you create the risk that nobody will be allowed to say anything interesting at all’ 
(Williams, 2013). 
 
There is a growing trend in universities for speakers to be banned, often because their views 
are deemed ‘unsafe’. In America it has been calculated that there have been 257 ‘dis-
invitation’ campaigns in universities since 2000 (Cole, 2015). In the UK the well-known 
feminist Germaine Greer hit the headlines following a campaign to have her banned from 
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speaking. Like another feminist, Julie Bindel who has also been ‘no platformed’, Greer was 
described as a transphobe and a campaign was launched to have her banned from Cardiff 
University.  An abortion debate between two men was banned at Oxford University, because 
it was two men speaking and those ‘without uteruses’ were not deemed to be the correct 
people to speak on this matter and also because the discussion could impact on the ‘mental 
safety’ of students (a ban that was supported by the university for security and welfare 
issues). Cambridge University have withdrawn a promotional video containing the famous 
historian David Starkey because of concerns about his offensive views (views that are not 
expressed in the video itself) (O’Neill, 2015a). 
 
The language of safety (and mental safety) is now used to restrict many ‘incorrect’ views. 
The University of East Anglia for example banned a local parliamentary UKIP (UK 
Independence Party (who oppose immigration)) candidate from speaking. The protest 
organiser explained that, ‘This is about ensuring the UEA students are on a campus where 
they feel safe, secure and respected’ (Hume, 2015, pp. 124). As Hume notes, the same 
students banning all sorts of individuals and ideas at their universities are the same ones who 
have expressed their outrage at the government’s Prevent strategy and its attempt to ban 
‘extremism’. Similarly lecturer’s organisations have protested about universities that restrict 
anti-Israel views (Alexander, 2014), while they themselves attempt to restrict potentially pro-
Israeli views through their promoted boycott of Israeli academics (Engage, 2015). Here we 
find a partial defence of freedom of speech based on the nature of the issue rather than a 
principled defence of freedom of speech in and of itself.   
 
Remarkably, a former student of University College London who fought with the Kurds 
against ISIS was also banned from speaking because UCLU didn’t want to take sides in the 
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conflict. The college management sought advice from the police but heard nothing back so 
erred on the side of caution. As Brendan O’Neil notes, this should not come as a surprise 
considering the NUS rejected a motion condemning ISIS in case it was seen as Islamophobic 
(O’Neill, 2015).  
 
It is relatively rare for speakers to be banned from universities in the UK but this is often 
because controversial speakers are rarely invited. However, what counts as controversial is 
itself expanding, as is the language associated with ‘hate’ and ‘phobia’. For their part, once 
again, it is less the university administrators who are pushing this approach than student 
bodies and activists – with, at times, help and encouragement from some lecturers. University 
authorities are however, inclined to ‘play it safe’, literally, by adopting arguments regarding 
student safety once a campaign or protest has been announced. For their part, vocal lecturers 
can be found defending certain speakers but it is relatively rare to find robust arguments for 
an open campus and a free for all of ideas. 
 
Protecting the vulnerable 
 
The examples listed above keep growing, and even as I write this paper there are more 
examples, regarding the banning of speakers and protests to limit the ‘offensive’ nature of 
university life.   
 
One specific example of the change to the curriculum under the guise of protecting 
vulnerable students can be seen in the Sociology A Level in England. Here, the classical 
work of Emile Durkheim - examining the issue of suicide, and which has been taught for 
decades - has now been dropped. The reason for this, as Rupert Sheard, AQA qualifications 
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manager, explained, is because of what he called a ‘a duty of care to all those students taking 
our course to make sure the content isn’t going to cause them undue distress’. As Ged Flynn, 
chief executive of Papyrus, a charity working to prevent youth suicide argued in response to 
this:  
 
Why are they removing this part of the syllabus? It’s not because Durkheim has 
suddenly become less important. It’s been dropped because people feel uncomfortable 
teaching about suicide because of the stigma and pain. But suicide won’t go away if 
we feel sensitive about it. Teachers need to get over themselves or get a new job 
(Guardian, 2015). 
 
This growing belief that students are vulnerable and need to be kept safe reflects a wider 
cultural sensitivity about words and ideas and about the emotional harm caused by them. The 
use of, what has now become known as the ‘n’ word, has been banned from the BBC. 
Newspapers in the UK are taking a similar editorial policy. Regardless of context or even if 
the ‘n’ word is to be discussed as part of an anti-racist discussion the word itself has been 
institutionally adorned as an ‘offensive’ word. What then for universities or lecturers who 
wish to discuss race, racism or plan to use material with this word in the text? What about 
other words that are offensive or make some students feel uncomfortable? Will our students 
begin complaining about terms or issues that make them feel ‘uncomfortable’? And if they do 
will management support the students or alternatively will they support academic freedom 
and perhaps explain, as Benjamin Disraeli did, that, ‘A university is a place of light, of 




When first writing this chapter I concluded that some of the issues raised here are more 
relevant to the USA than the UK, noting that it is worth bearing in mind that the US has the 
First Amendment and the UK does not and that in that respect UK laws are actually far worse 
than those in the US, despite developments in American university campuses. However, in a 
relatively short space of time I would now conclude that the UK is competing with the US on 
this issue and in some respects may be leading the way in their protection of students from 
offensive words and ideas. A number of UK laws, a number of universities and many student 
associations in the UK are highly censorious and appear to be increasingly so, often within 
the framework of protecting students from things that are deemed to be offensive. As words 
and ideas increasingly become associated with negative feelings it will be up to lecturers, 
management and indeed students themselves to defend both free speech and academic 
freedom and that means defending the expression of views and ideas we may often disagree 
with. If this is not forthcoming the climate of offence taking is likely to increase: And note 
that in 2007 a UK survey found that 64 percent of the British public surveyed supported the 
right of people, ‘not to be exposed to offensive views’. This contrasted to 54 percent of 




It is difficult to judge what will happen to academic freedom. In the UK for example a Free 
Speech Union has recently been formed to challenge many of the issues raised in this paper. 
We will have to wait and see if this will act as a barrier to the corrosion of this freedom.  
 
Historically there appears to be a dialectical relationship between the diminishing sense of 
human possibilities through collective political action, and the diminishing individual subject 
32 
 
seen with the emergence of the ‘vulnerable student’. Liberalism was about the individual but 
it was a universal-societal individual that inspired John Stuart Mill’s belief in liberty. In the 
twentieth century Mill’s passion and belief in freedom was taken up by alternative left and 
radical voices but this optimism was short lived. As the belief in social transformation 
declined so too did the liberal/radical defence of freedom of speech and academic freedom – 
indeed it was often on the left that arguments developed that challenged these ‘bourgeois 
freedoms’. Alongside these developments, though less clearly scrutinised, the norm of Mill’s 
robust liberal subject has diminished and human subjectivity, in general rather than simply in 
terms of ‘vulnerable groups’ is now comprehended through the presumption of a universal 
vulnerability. In other words, with the hollowing out of political ideas and organisations we 
have witnessed a diminishing of the belief in individual freedom and tolerance and a 
diminishing, or at least a presumption, of diminished individual capacity or subjectivity. And 
the diminished, vulnerable subject needs safety and protection far more than it desires 
freedom.  
 
Over time, the academic assault on Truth has helped to construct a relativistic academic 
culture and has helped to transform the very meaning of liberal categories like tolerance. 
Today’s tolerant liberals are at the forefront of the assault on genuine tolerance and academic 
freedom, and have helped to portray freedom of speech as a right wing issue. These illiberal 
trends have been accelerated in the last decade by the emergence of a new generation of 
student activists, often oriented around identity politics, who not only carry the fragmented 
and relativistic sensibility of their academic elders but also embody more acutely the post-
modern sensibility of vulnerability. Sometimes opportunistically or cynically used, these 





The third dimension of modern restrictions of academic freedom come from university 
administrators who are equally confused about the meaning of truth and indeed of freedom 
and tolerance. Lacking a clarity of purpose, like many other modern institutions, they have 
tended towards safety based policies coupled with a more therapeutic engagement with 
students. Helped by the push of modern student activists and the relativistic academic culture, 
universities increasingly play it safe and can at least feel confident that in keeping vulnerable 
students safe, they are following ‘best practice’. 
 
The result is a conformist culture where restrictions on academic freedom come less from a 
powerful ideology than from a need to ensure that everyone is ‘aware’ of everyone else’s 
vulnerability. 
 
One of the more aggressive, vibrant, offensively intelligent and yet still well humoured 
debates I have watched is that between the American author Norman Mailer and Germaine 
Greer that took place in New York Town Hall in 1971. A debate like this should be what 
universities aspire towards for their students. Sadly, I suspect the triumvirate of identity 
activism, a relativistic academic culture overseen by a therapeutic university management, all 
coalescing around the ‘vulnerable student’, make this type of event less and less likely today. 
Mailer’s aggressive style and questioning of women’s liberation would be ‘unsafe’ but also 
today, we would find the feminist Greer facing a possible ban for transphobia. Greer’s crime 
is that of stating that a person with a penis is not a woman. Something that until recently was 
recognised as a biological fact, through a therapeutic lens is no longer a truth but another 
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